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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
E. J. HUBER and
RALPH DUNKLEY,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.

Case
No. 66166

VICTOR NEWMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
Whether or not appellant's petition for a rehearing
and reversal be granted, appellant petitions the Supreme
Court for a modification of its opinion and judgment herein
so as to require and direct the District Court as follows :
a. That if and when any judgment of that court
against this appellant shall be entered and become final,
that the said judgment and any moneys that may come into
the hands of its clerk or other officer as proceeds thereof
or security therefor, shall be treated as the assets of a
defunct or ended partnership, joint venture, or joint business enterprise, and be held by the court in the hands of
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its clerk or receiver until the just debts and liabilities
thereof shall have been paid.
b. That said district court be directed to require the
issuance of citation and notice to creditors of said partnership or joint business enterprise to come in, present and
prove their claims before the Court within a suitable time
limit. And that the provisions of Utah Annot. Code, 1943,
69-1-35 and 69-1-67 and other applicable provisions of said
title and chapter, and the settled principles of equity practice and procedure be complied with.
c. That as to the indebtedness of said. joint enterprise
to any creditor which may have meantime been paid by
this appellant, that he be substituted to the rights of such
creditor with respect to his right to present and prove the
same before the Court and be paid or credited therewith
before distribution is made.
d. That only the balance of such judgment or funds
after payment of creditors, as aforesaid, may be held for
distribution among the parties hereto according to the
terms and provisions of any such final judgment, if and
when rendered, entered and become final.
And for grounds of this motion appellant respectfully
says that the Supreme Court in its opinion and judgment
herein erred :
1. In ignoring said Utah code provisions and thereby
depriving appellant of his property without due process
of law, contrary to the provisions of Utah Constitution,
art. 1, section 7; the 14th amendment, section 1, of the
Constitution of the United States; and the 5th amendment
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to said United States Constitution. And further depriving appellant of equal protection of the law contrary to
Utah Constitution, art. 1, section 2; and United States
Constitution, 14th amendment, section 1.
2. In giving effect to a method of distribution of
asserted partnership assets without first causing payment
to be made to creditors of the partnership of their just
claims and demands and citing them to appear and prove
their claims.
3. In giving effect by affirmance to a substitute method
of distribution of partnership assets, by requiring indemnity against liability for firm debts in lieu of payment
thereof before distribution, and then dispensing with such
indemnity and giving judgment for distribution, in violation of the provisions of said Title 69, chapter 1, Utah
Annot. Code of 1943.
4. In order to give point to these errors appellant
respectfully refer the Court to the evidences of outstanding
claims and demands against the asserted partnership of
Newman-Huber-Dunkley as follows:
(a) Claim by R. M. Birdzell for $2,632.46 which
has now been fully paid by appellant, the same being
just and correct.
(b) Claim by Harrison & Dorman for $5006.12
on the first cause of action and $2500 on second
cause of action, shown by certified copy of the
complaint and register of actions in case No. 71613
of the said district court against the parties to
this action. The action is being defended by appellant but appellees are in default.
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Reference is made to the referee's report (Rec.
p. 452) for these items, and to the accompanying
exhibits filed in this Court herewith under separate
cover.
(c) A claim by the United States Government
for excess profits by virtue of its "renegotiation"
of contracts embracing the Hospital Job, in the sum
of $40,000, as evidenced by its written demand for
payment one-half on March 31, 1944, and balance
on June 30, 1944, served on the parties to this
action and filed in the Supreme Court of Utah on
April 4, 1944. See exhibits filed herewith under
separate cover.
{d) Notice of claim by the State of Utah for
sand and gravel or other materials removed from
State lands and hauled and delivered in performance
of contracts involved in this action, in the sum of
about $2100, and notice of claim or demand therefor
announced to the district court during the trial
of this action (Rec. p. 420).
(e) The possibility of other claims and demands
that may come to notice hereafter and be enforced
against Newman, who alone is solvent and financially responsible, until such possibility is eliminated
by due notice and citation to creditors to present
their claims.
0. H. MATTHEWS,
P. G. ELLIS,
Attorneys for Appellam.
STATUTES
The following sections and parts of Utah Annotated
Code of 1943, Title 69, Chapter 1, are pertinent:
69-1-15. The rights and duties of the partners
in relation to the partnership shall be determined,
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subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules :
( 1) Enc:h partner shall be repaid his con tributions, whether by way of capital or advances to
the partnership, and share equally in the profits and
surplus remaining after all liabilities including those
to partners, are satisfied; and must contribute
tovvard the losses, whether of capital or otherwise,
sustained by the partnership according to his share
in the profits.
(2) The partnership must indemnify every
partner in respect of payments made and personal
liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the
preservation of its business or property.
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership
makes any payment or advance beyond the amount
of capital which he agreed to contribute shall be paid
interest from the date of the payment or advance.

*

*

*

*

69-1-33 (1) The dissolution of a partnership
does not of itself discharge the existing liability of
any partner.
69-1-35(1) When dissolution is caused in any
way, except in contravention of the partnership
agreement, each partner, as against his copartners
and all persons claiming through them in respect
of their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus
applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the
respective partners.
69-1-37. In settling accounts between partners
after dissolution the following rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:
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(1) The assets of the partnership are:
(a) The partnership property.
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of all liabilities specified in subdivision (2) of this section.
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank
in order of payment as follows :
(a) Those owing to creditors other than
partners.
(b) Those owing to partners other than
for capital and profits.
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of
capital.
(d) Those owing to partners in respect of
profits.
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of
their declaration in subdivision (1) of this section
to the satisfaction of the liabilities.
( 4) The partners shall contribute as provided
by section 69-1-15 (1) the amount necessary to
satisfy the liabilities; but if any but not all of the
partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to
process, refuse to contribute, the other parties shall
contribute their share of the liabilities, etc. * * *
( 5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors,
or any person appointed by the court, shall have
the right to enforce the contributions specified in
subdivision ( 4) of this section.
( 6) Any partner or his legal representative
shall have the right to enforce the contributions
specified in subdivision (4) of this section.

*

*

*

*
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BRIEF

In our accompanying brief on petition for rehearing
we showed that the referee's report in this case is void on
its face, a dead and lifeless thing. A dead person or thing
cannot speak or be heard. In order to further show its
uselessness we shall, in this brief, treat the report as if
the objections to its invalidity did not exist. The report
is attached to the bill of exceptions under the rear clothbound cover.
This is a proceeding to dissolve a partnership as it is
called in the complaint, wind up its business, take an
account and distribute the assets. The accounting and distribution is governed by statute, Utah Code 1943, Title 69,
Chapter 1, and must conform to its provisions. And this
is true whether the account is taken by the court itself or
by its referee. And the very first step is to determine the
rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership, subject to the agreement between them, if any, and
according to the rules specified in Code section 69-1-15.
Unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise, each
partner must, in distribution, be repaid his contributions
to the capital of the firm, and also his advances or loans
to it in the course of its business (69-1-15 (1). Wherefore,
the terms of the agreement, if any, and the amount of the
contributions and loans or advances by each partner to the
firm must be found as facts, as a first step in the accounting, and stated separately as we next see. F'or these must
be repaid in their statutory order or turn. After all liabilities of the firm, both to strangers and to partners are
paid, then the partners share in the profits and surplus
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remaining, and must contribute toward the losses whether
of capital or otherwise, in the same proportion as he shares
in the profits. And so the account taken should exhibit
the (a) original capital, (b) the profits, and (c) the
surplus, as well as (d) all liabilities, including those to
partners; and show (e) the losses, whether "of capital or
otherwise" (specifying which) sustained by the partnership, toward which each partner must contribute ratably.
(69-1-15 (1.)
Not only so, but the account should disclose (a) the
payments made and (b) liabilities reasonably incurred by
each partner in the ordinary and proper conduct of the
business, or for the preservation of its business and property; because the partnership must indemnify each partner
for all such disbursements. (69-1-15 (2.)
And finally, the account should show any payment or
advance made by each partner "beyond the amount which
he agreed to contribute," for the partnership must pay
interest upon any such excess. (69-1-15 (3.)
Section 69-1-35 gives to each partner the right to insist upon having the partnership assets applied to discharge first its liabilities (whether to strangers or partners), and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount
due to each partner. The amount due to each being figured
by the above rules.
The account taken by the referee is lacking in segregation and separate statement of almost every one of the above
essentials, viz. : terms of agreement, agreed contributions
of each partner to capital, amount of each partner's loans
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or advancements in excess of contributions to capital, liabilities of the firm (a) to strangers and (b) to partners;
the profits and surplus, and losses (a) of capital (b) or
otherwise, stated separately. Also, (a) payments made and
(b) liabilities incurred by each partner for the common
benefit for which he must be indemnified; and payments
by each partner in excess of his agreed contribution to
capital, on which he must receive interest.
How can a partner demand and insist upon the statutory distribution unless the account taken discloses these
various essential items and order of payments?
Section 69-1-37 provides that in settling accounts between partners after dissolution the following rules shall
be observed unless there is some agreement to the contrary, viz. :
(1) The assets consist of (a) the partnership property
and (b) the contributions of the partners to pay liabilities
as follows:
(2) The liabilities shall rank in order of payment as
follows : (a) to creditors other than partners; (b) to partners other than for capital and profits; (c) to partners
in respect of capital, and (d) to partners in respect of
profits.
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order specified
in subdivision ( 1) of this section in satisfaction of liabilities.

( 4) The partners shall contribute as provided by section 69-1-15 ( 1) the amount necessary to satisfy liabilities.
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( 5) An assignee for creditors, or any person appointed
by the court has the right to enforce the contributions
specified in subdivision ( 4) hereof.
(6) Any partner shall have the right to enforce contributions specified in subdivision ( 4) hereof.
The referee's account does not state separately (a) the
partnership property and (b) the contributions required
of each partner in order to satisfy the liabilities specified
in subdivision (2) as above. That is to say, the referee
made no finding of fact, to wit: no adjudication of the
facts which by statute must constitute the basis for distribution of the assets to creditors and partners in the statutory order of priority or preference.
An official act required by statute which does not conform to the statute is ineffectual and void, and a failure to
object thereto does not validate it, being void upon its face
(see pages zy.. JJ of our brief on rehearing filed herewith). For that matter, the report was not evidence but
adjudication, if effectual at all, and if void on its face requires no objection at any set time or place. Also, thereport was produced by plaintiffs' counsel and filed (Rec.
p. 316) in the midst of a trial undertaken for other and
unknown purposes, without pleadings or issues, and without opportunity for inspection and preparation of w~itten
objections and exceptions, which the law envisages. If the
referee had filed his report in court which appointed him
to act, at the time it was completed on May 28, 1943, as
was his duty, ·the situation would have been different.
Instead he gave it to the plaintiffs' attorney who suppressed
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it until he was ready to file it in the midst of a trial on
unknown issues.
Certainly one of the most indispensible requirements
of the governing statute is a clear statement of the debts
and liabilities of the defunct partnership (a) to strangers
and (b) to partners, itemized as per statute, supra, as a
guide to the order of payment and distribution of the
assets. The referee's report did not attempt to comply
with this primary requirement of the statute. And yet
the power and authority conferred upon him by law and
the order of reference was that he might conduct a trial,
hear evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions
of law upon which the court could enter a judgment for
payment to creditors and distribution of the balance to
the partners in conformity to the statute. Nor did the
district court's own findings of fact supply the omissions
in the report in this respect.
Page 5 of the referee's report shows that his attention
was attracted to the subject of creditors, and he mentions
one claim by R. M. Birdzell for $2632.45, and another by
Harrison & Dorman for $7579.64 (Rec. p. 452), but he
does not adjudicate them, or say he has investigated and
allowed them, and find that they should be paid. He passes
them up to the district court and says that if the court
finds them 0. K. they should be paid by contributions of
the partners, one-third each. The district court did not
accept the suggestion that it inquire as to creditors with
preferential rights but gave judgment against defendant
partner for distribution of the assets without payment
of debts. Appellant has paid the Birdzell claim and is de-
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fending the Harrison-Dorman claim in court.
filed herewith.)

(See exhibits

But the two claims mentioned were not, and are not,
all the claims and liabilities outstanding against the assets
of the partnership. A demand has been made by the
United States War Department upon each and all the
parties to this action, as partners, for the payment of
$40,000, whereof one-half is payable March 31st, the other
half on June 30th, 1944, for excess profits charged and
paid during the year 1942 on sundry jobs of which the
Hospital Job in this case was one. And in the process of
collection the government has laid its hand upon the net
earnings of the Hospital Job, and forbidden its distribution to the partners or others in this case. That is done
pursuant to a statute of the United States passed in aid
of the defense effort, and to conserve the government
financing of war defense contracts. See notice and demand
served on counsel for all parties in this case by the United
States and filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme
Court on April 4th, 1944. And see bound exhibits filed
herewith under separate cover. And see section 403 of the
Sixth Supplemental National Defense Act, 1942, as amended.
That is certainly a liability of the partnership arising from
public law and the very incidents of the contract for the
Hospital Job under which the earnings involved herein
accrued. And if the assets are insufficient the partners
are liable for contribution to meet it. Hence it appears
that there can be no net earnings available for distribution
until the claims of creditors are adjudicated and paid.
Yet the district court has entered up a judgment against
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appellant for $19,451.03 by way of attempted distribution
of assets without regard to liabilities. The district court's
attention was called to this hazard and liability of the
Hospital Job contract to be renegotiated and profits eliminated (Rec. p. 420). And the court even undertook to
require security against renegotiation as well as payment of
debts in the sum of some $10,000 by requiring a $7000
bond to indemnify against several times that amount of
liabilities. And the indemnifying bond was never given.
But judgment went for $19,451.03 just the same.
Nor was the foregoing all the liabilities. Appellant's
counsel gave notice, and announced in open court, at the
moment when the discussion about the indemnifying bond
was going on, that he had just received notice that the
State of Utah claimed a large sum against this partnership
for excavation of gravel or other materials from a pit
on State lands. (Rec. p. 420.) But neither court nor
counsel paid any attention. They went right along discussing the giving of a $7000 bond (never in fact given)
·as if the matter of debts and liabilities several times that
amount was of no significance.
The only way in which the district court could be sure
in this matter would be for it to cause a notice to creditors
of the concern to come in and present and prove their
claims within a reasonable time limit, or be barred, according to settled equity practice in the administration of
estates for the benefit of creditors and partners or stockholders. We called attention to this statutory and equity
procedure at pages 87-88 of our opening brief on this
appeal. For further data on this point see infra page 21.
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NET EARNINGS
Going now to another indispensible feature of an
accounting in order to make the statutory distribution of
assets, we go to the opposite side of the ledger and inquire
how much were the net earnings. The referee attempted
to answer this question in Exhibit A to his report (Rec.
p. 455) where a tabulation is made of receipts and disbursements. Thus:
Gross earnings, itemized, . . . . . . . . . $61,138.48
Expenses,
Disbursements itemized
Accounts payable,
"
Railroad Job,
"
Total, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47,667.60
Net earnings, ........... $13,470.78
By reference to the tabulations in Exhibits B and C
to the report (Rec. p. 456-457) it appears that, due to
debits and credits in the account of each partner with the
firm, this $13,470.78 is nearly all in the hands of partner
Newman-that is, $13,386·.37 of it. And the balance of
$84.41 must have been in the hands of one or both the other
partners Huber andjor Dunkley. Thus:
Total net earnings, ............. . $13,470.78
Newman's account, ............. . 13,386.37
Elsewhere, ..................... $

84.41

The result is that partner Newman appears to owe
his firm of Newman-Huber-Dunkiley practically all its
present capita.l assets. And the firm (if it had paid its

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
debts) owed Newman back his one-third of the capital
belonging to him on distribution, that is, one-third of
$13,470.78, which is $4,490.26. Deduct this $4,490.26 from
the net capital funds in his hands which is $13,386.37, and
Newman would really be accountable for only the balance
of $8,896.11 to Huber and Newman for their two-thirds
share of the net earnings. Assuming that the debts were
all paid $8,896.11 is the most that partner Newman is
liable for to his partners, according to the referee's report.
Notwithstanding which, a judgment was entered for the full
$13,386.37 (of which he himself was part owner) in favor
of the other two partners, coupled with another illegal
item of $6,064.66 (of which we speak presently), and
thereby brought the total judgment to $19,451.03.
But the debts of the firm have not been paid in full,.
and both the court and the referee knew it. At least they
knew there were potential claims of creditors that ought
to be adjudicated. And the court, conscious of its duty
in the premises, at first proposed to hold back from judgment and distribution enough of the $13,386.37 in New-man's hands to meet and pay the Birdzell and Harrisonnorman claims (Rec. p. 367-371 and post p. 22). But
the court was prevailed upon by plaintiffs' counsel to sidestep this duty and give judgment for distribution without
regard to creditors. The court at first ordered an in-demnifying bond of $7000.00 to secure creditors, an insufficient amount; then relented and gave judgment in full
without security. (Rec. p. 88-92.) The court was without discretion or authority to disregard the governing stat-ute and adopt a substitute, or no substitute, in dealing with
the claims of creditors, and the rights of defendant partner~
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The district court adopted by copying the tabulations
in Exhibits A, B and C of the referee's report, self-condemnatory as they are, into its own finding; paragraph 5
(Rec. p. 85-87). And then it proceeded in its next paragraph 6 to add $6,064.66 to the $13,386.37 erroneously
charged by paragraph 5, to give judgment for the total
$19,451.03. This was done, not on the basis of anything_
contained or stated in the referee's report nor upon any
evidence before the referee coming into court with the
report, but upon evidence de novo taken by the district
court at its adjourned June, 1943, session of trial of this
case. To properly understand this new evidence, and its
scope, we must go back and understand the scope of the
firm's business comprised in the referee's report of business closing on September 3rd, 1942.
At the first two days' trial in April, 1942, the plain..
tiffs proved as part of their case that the firm's business
closed with completion of the Hospital Job on September
3rd, 1942 (Dunkley, Rec. p. 191; Earl Bishop, Rec. p. 356-7).
And the trial court on April 6th, 1943, ruled from the
bench that on September 3rd, 1942 "the joint venture on
all these operations ceased at that time." (Rec. p. 303, 305.)
Accordingly the court in the order of reference directed the
referee to take the accounting down to September 3rd,
1942 (Rec. p. 78-79). And the referee's report was that
he had investigated within that limitation, in producing
the balance of $13,386.37 against Newman of firm assets
in his hands. See also Schedule "7" of his report CRee. p.
463) whereon this item appears, viz.:
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HOSPITAL JOB,
Yardage hauled from Aug. 11, 1942
to Sept. 3rd, 1942, per letter &c,
59492 cu. yds at 59 cents,. . $41,049.48
And this item was figured into the general summary of
Exhibits A and B of the report. Nothing after September
3rd was figured in the tabulations of the report.
But the referee on page 4 of his report (Rec. p. 451)
made mention of information he had received in a letter
from some one that Newman had hauled some additional
yardage on the Hospital Job after September 3rd, 1942,
in an amount bringing up the total hauled from 49·,492
cubic yards shown in the report, to 72,676.05 cubic yards;
that is, an increase of 13,184.05 yards. But the referee
says in his report that he had been unable by his unofficial
and nonjudicial inquiries to ascertain the facts as to the
placement of this additional yardage-whether on the Hospital Job itself (before reported complete and finished
on September 3, 1942), or whether it was hauled to other
locations as required by the Army Engineers. Hence the
referee did not adjudicate or find the facts in this regard,
and there was no basis in the report or evidence behind it
for the district court to do so.
But the report at bottom of Rec. p. 451 to 452 does
recite that the original Hospital Job contract called for
a total of 100,000 cubic yards of fill to be hauled at 59
cents a cubic yard. In view of the report and record showing, supra, that the Hospital Job was completed on September 3, 1942, with the delivery of only 59,492 cubic yards
at the hospital site, this leaves open the inquiry as to what
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-if anything became of the balance of 40,508 cubic yards that
the Army Engineers could have required under the contract.
The answer to this question is partly revealed in evidence taken before the district court at its first session
beld on April 5th-6th, 1942, before the referee was appointed, but which was not carried into the referee's
investigations or report. From that evidence it appears
that the Army Engineers maneuvered to compel Newman
to complete the 100,000 cubic yards called for in his contract for the Hospital Job by deliveries of material required
by the Army at other locations near Wendover, without
having to let a new contract therefor. On this point Newman testified before the court in April, 1942, that:
"The contract was written for 100,000 yards
of fill for a total price of $59,000. I had a lot of
trouble trying to get an estimate. I needed the
money and I couldn't get an estimate through for
the money that was coming. So the Army Engineers
told me, "Why don't you finish your haul?" So, I
says, "All right, I will finish the haul for thirtyone thousand, approximately, that was still owing on
the hospital job, and I hauled that 31,000 yards to
various locations as the Army Engineers directed.
So that the Hospital Job, the original contract, was
not finished until January 21, 1943. The dirt that
was hauled since Sept. 16th, 1943 went to various
locations as the Army Engineers directed, but I had
to do that in order to get my money from the Army
Engineers. (Rec. p. 239-240.)
This testimony was not repeated before the referee
for the simple reason that the referee did not conduct a
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trial, call for witnesses or give counsel an opportunity to
produce them and try the case in observance of due process
of law. If he had done this he would have had the foregoing evidence before him and would have known that he
need not trouble himself therewith under the terms of the
order of reference limiting him to September 3rd, 1942.
He had nothing to do with the "placement" of material
delivered thereafter to other locations. Appellees had terminated their connection with Newman on September 3rd,
1942; Huber had gone elsewhere, and Dunkley was working for Newman at $100 a week wages.
But the bare mention of this additional haulage after
September 3rd, 1942, by Newman excited the cupidity of
appellees and their trial attorney, and they set out to try
and "get in on it" by additional trial proceedings when the
district court met again in adjourned session on June 3rd4th, 1942. There was and is no authority of law for this
attempt to open up the referee's trial (if it may be so
termed) and get in behind the referee's findings of fact
in his report, by means of evidence de novo that was not
heard or considered by the referee, nor authorized in the
order of reference. Not any more than there would be to
take evidence de novo to enlarge the amount of a jury
verdict or to enlarge the recovery in the court's findings
of fact in a trial without a jury. The only recourse was
either to obtain a new trial or to appeal, if dissatisfied
with the amount recovered.
Even if this unusual and illegal procedure could be
tolerated under existing law, yet there was no evidence
-offered de novo before the court to match and reproduce
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the information before the referee upon which he attempted
to adjudicate the various items of debits, credits and balances on account of transactions closing September 3rd,
1942. So that the basis for district court findings consisted of a sort of patchwork-report and adjudication
without a trial or evidence before the referee, relating to
transactions prior to September 3rd, 1942, spliced with
evidence de novo taken before the district court as to
transactions after September 3rd, 1942, without proofs of
operating costs and expenses whereby to strike a balance
and show net earnings.
Assuming that this procedure were legally or theoreti-cally possible, the testimony submitted was utterly and
absurdly inadequate to prove the proposition that plaintiffs
were entitled to credit for the additional haulage by New-man to various locations after September 3rd, 1942, under
orders of the Army Engineers, even though allocated to theHospital Job total haulage authorized of 100,000 cubic
yards. If any one wishes to go through the record of plaintiffs' attempt to do this, the record is there for his information, pages 309-422.
To sum up, however, the district court did entertain
this attempt to do the impossible, and considered the fragmentary data offered, during which plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly confessed himself helpless and bankrupt of the
desired proofs. For our treatment of this subject see our·
opening brief on this appeal at pages 91-97.
In the district court's findings of fact at the end of this
abortive attempt to open and enlarge the recovery in the
referee's report, the court recorded a finding of fact that
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72,676.05 cubic yards were hauled and delivered on the
Hospital Job (an enlargement of 13,184.05 over the 59,492
cubic yards found in the referee's report) priced at 69 cents
a cubic yard (in lieu of 59 cents in the contract), amounting to $6,064.66, and added that amount to the $13,386.37
reported by the referee, as net earnings, without even
inquiring as to the cost and expenses incurred by Newman
in making the additional haulage and deliveries after September 3rd, 1942.
There is evidence in the record that the occasion for
the change order and increased price was that better and
more desirable material was available at another place requiring a longer haul and greater cost to the contractor.
This change order was initiated on September 6th, 1942
(after appellees no longer were connected with the job and
while Dunkley was working for wages for Newman at
$100 a week, which is not disputed on either side), and
was finally approved by the War Department in December,
1942, after nearly all the additional haulage had been done
by Newman. In consideration of the longer haul and extra
cost the government allowed ten cents a cubic yard to
Newman for the entire job. But the whole and entire
consideration for this change order was performed by
Newman alone, and not by Huber or Dunkley. See record
pages 397 to 403.

Debts and Liabilities. (See ante pages 10-13.) Before
closing, we recur to this feature of the accounting. At the
adjourned session of court in June, 1943, the court and
counsel were discussing the claims of creditors and the
possibility of renegotiation of the Hospital Job contract
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eliminating part of the net profits, if any. The Birdzeli
and Harrison-Dorman claims being particularly mentioned.
We quote certain remarks of the court only, so as to show
that it had in mind the rights of creditors, and the right
of a partner to have debts paid before distribution. Thus;
THE COURT:
"In order to find the amount due I have to
determine what the net profit is, and I can't do that
until I determine what the obligations are." (Rec. p.
367-8.)
"Of course, there is this partnership proposition; these alleged creditors could probably sue one
or all of them." (Rec. p. 368.)
"Why not put enough of this money to cover
these claims some place and let them bring an action
against one or all?" (Rec. p. 368.)
"Or, the suggestion of the plaintiffs in this
case that they indemnify." (Rec. p. 369.)
"Maybe what I should do is to hold this up and
let them sue." (Rec. p. 371.)
"I wouldnt want to distribute this amount here.
I wouldnt want to say now that they dont owe these
people that money and therefore distribute it. - (Rec.
p. 371.)
Notwithstanding which the court in its finding of fact,
paragraph 7, R.ec. p. 88, incorporated a provision requiring that plaintiffs Huber and Dunkley give an indemnifying bond for $7000.00 to protect Newman against having
to pay the claims of Birdzell and Harrison-Dorman, which
totalled $10,212.09, or rather against two-thirds thereof
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which Huber and Dunkley would be liable for, in the sum
of $6,808.66, togther with costs, expenses and damages
and also covering "any renegotiatiow" by the War Department in respect of excess profits. The $7000 bond would
barely cover the two-thirds of the Birdzell and HarrisonDorman cairns alone, not to speak of the hazard of renegotiation proceedings involving a much larger contingent
liability, which has now eventuated in a demand for repayment of $40,000.00 in short order. We do not know how
much of this $40,000 is allocable to the Hospital Job or
other job involved in this action; nor whether the Government will insist on holding all the earnings until a settlement is made. In any event we are advised that the excess
profits on the Hospital Job alone are equal to or in excess
of the entire net earnings on all the jobs reported by the
referee, which was $13,470.78. This is due to the fact that
while the total earnings on the Hospital Job alone is reported by the referee as $41,049.48, there were losses on the
other jobs embraced in the report, which reduced the net
earnings on all the jobs together down to $13,470.78, as
shown in Exhibit A (Rec. p. 455).
As it turned out, no indemnifying bond was ever given,
and yet the court gave judgment for distribution to partners Huber and Dunkleye for $19,451.03, contrary to the
express provisions of our statutes quoted on the opening
pages of this brief, which require payment to creditors in
cash, before any distribution to partners.
We think the clear result is that the judgment appealed
from should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
But that in any event this court's opinion and judgment
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should be modified so as to require the district court, in
the event it shall finally find against this appellant, to
proceed in conformity to Title 6H, Chapter 1, by citing creditors in to present and prove their claims, and thereafter by
proceeding under said chapter and title in determining the
distributive share of each partner before ordering distribution.
Respectfully submitted,
0. H. MATTHEWS,
P. G. ELLIS,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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